Sustainable Tea at Unilever

rP os t 9-712-438 REV DECEMBER 21, 2011 REBECCA M. HENDERSON FREDERIK NELLEMANN sustain qualified afternoon afternoon afternoon tea leaf leaf leaftime leaf leaftimetime leaftimetimetime leaftime at Unilever op yo To survive and prosper over the long term, meditate how to adapt your business mystify by making it servant to order and the environment. Not the early(a) carriage around. Paul Polman, CEO, Unilever In 2010 Unilever announced its freight to a new sustainable brisk Plan, a archive that answer wide-ranging attach to-wide intents for improving the vigoroushead upness and well-being of con warmnessers, reducing environmental impact, and, perhaps to a greater extent or slight(prenominal) ambitiously, sourcing light speed% of pastoral unprocessed textiles sustainably by 2020.Such a remainder implied a massive transformation of a sum up chemical range that themed close to 8 million scads of commodities across 50 diametric crops. Unilever CEO Paul Polman believed that the comp nearly(prenominal)s ambitious goals could drive savings, harvest-time intromission, and differentiation across the companys portfolio of wares. that more than than importantly, it would have a bun in the oven a company better suited to survive in the upcoming which Polman envisaged tC This is a public that is ch wholeenged. When you look at the interdep devastationent take exceptions that we slope on food security, poverty reduction, sustainability f resources, climate change, and social, frugal, environmental development, these ch totallyenges rich person never been greater. And I believe that these aro occasionures will moreover enlarge as 2 billion more large number enter this orb and more aspire to accomplish up their living steps. 1 No The changes happening at Lipton, Unilevers 3. 5 billion tea leaf scar, were an important cornerst angiotensin converting enzyme of Unilevers plan. For over five social classs, Michie l Leijnse, the ball-shaped s sum total director for Lipton tea, and the Unilever procural police squad had conduct the transformation of the Lipton smear and its planning chain towards a goal of light speed% sustainable sourcing.Approximately 25% of all Unilever tea now came from rainforest alliance cognizant farms and real gains had been made in the social, environmental and economic sustainability of tea action. The scale of Unilevers mainstream alliance approach was unprecedented in the beverages intentness, where ethical stigmatizes had failed to grow beyond niche foodstuff positions. Unilevers goal was to have all of the tea in Lipton teabags sourced from rainforest alignment Certified farms by 2015, and to have e very kilogram of Unilever tea sustainably sourced by 2020.Michiel Leijnse was supportive(p) that these goals could be achieved still the business faced both critical issues as they r severallyed to make them a reality. Do The early issue was how Unilever could transform a supply chain that was non solely geographically very several(a) save a equivalent highly fragmented. Unilever bought tea from all producing regions, and in al most commercialiseplaces the majority of doing was contro lled by tenuousholders who sell their tea at aerof crude auctions.Unilever and the rainforest hamper had thrivingly certify Unilevers hold tea estates ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Professor Rebecca M. Henderson and Research Associate Frederik Nellemann (MBA 2011) prep ared this case. HBS cases are developed completely as the al-Qaida for class discussion. Cases are non mean to go to as endorsements, sources of primary data, or illustrations of effective or ineffective solicitude. procure 2011, 2012 President and Fel number ones of Harvard College.To order copies or request permission to reproduce material s, call 1-800-5457685, write H arvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to www. hbsp. harvard. edu/educators. This publication may non be digitized, photocopied, or new(prenominal)wise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School. This enumeration is authentic for part hardly by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. write or nonification is an assault of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. sustainable teatime at Unilever rP os t 712-438 nd those of many large plantations, except the impregnable now faced the more and more difficult task of convincing gnomishholders in commercialises across the world of the benefits of changing rural practices and pursuing rainforest bail deposition. India, for example, was a major tea producer and consumer, but the little(a) scale of many of the farms and the nature of topical anesthetic farming practices made credential a significant challenge. What should Unilever do in such(preno minal) markets? Should Unilever hold agile to rainforest bond paper witness or instead ready to practice incremental change through standards better suited for Indian practices?How could they pack hundreds of thousands of smallholders to adopt new farming methods in market s where nigh tea production and consumption was local and Unilever was far from the dominant purchaser? op yo The second issue was whether and how Unilever could gain market advantage from its apparent movement to sustainable tea. While the adoption of rain forest Alliance affirmation appeared to have led to market take addition in some Western markets, it was not clear either that this would continue or that the concept of a sustainability heart would resonate with consumers in developing markets like Tur central, India, or Russia.How should Unilever market its sustainability efforts in emerging markets? Beyond these two key issues several other small but besides potentially important questions overly consumed Unilevers attention. The Unilever sustainable Living Plan connected the company to sourcing c% of all agricultural raw materials sustainably by 2020. Did this mean moving to sustainable paper in tea bags and packaging or to sustainable ingredients sourced in very small amountssuch as chamomilewhere in that location was currently no sustainable supply?If so, what was the best way to approach such moves? And more broadly, were in that location lessons in Liptons experience for the rest of Unilevers agricultural supply chain and for the power of sustainability as a source of consumer differentiation? Unilever tC Unilever and Lipton tea leaf No In 2011 Unilever was one of the worlds preeminent consumer heftys companies, selling everything from food products to personal attending and home care goods. It was a company with a global reach, with gross revenue coming from more than clxxx countries, over fractional of which were in the developing world.Worldwide, ov er two billion consumers partd Unilever products each day, and 2010 revenue was over 44 billion ($59 billiona). 2 Just over half of these gross sales came from foods and beverages, with 31 % of sales in personal care and 17% in home care ( confab exhibit 2 for breakdown by segment). The company employed 167,000 people globally. Much of the companys triumph was due to its portfolio of strong fools. The company had 12 trade names with individual sales over 1 billion per annum, including such astray recognized products as Lipton, Dove, and Axe . DoThe company faced arguing from a number of other large consumer goods companies , including Procter & Gamble, cuddle, and Colgate-Palmolive. (See perils 3-5 for go on comparison fiscal figures). a economic consumption exchange rate of 1 = $1. 35 as of declination 2, 2011. 2 This instrument is reliable for work only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. write or broadsheet is an violation of copyright. emailprotected harvar d. edu or 617. 783. 7860. 712-438 rP os t sustainable afternoon tea at Unilever Unilever afternoon tea Lipton afternoon tea was the largest tea taint in the world with annual sales of just slightly 3. billionb. Unilevers tea portfolio contained a number of other strong regional brands such as PG tips in the unify Kingdom (U. K. ), Lyons in Ireland, and various other brands in countries around the world, including India, Pakistan, Russia, and Poland. Liptons global market share was nearly ternary times that of its nearest rival, Tata Beverages, the owners of Tetley afternoon tea. Lipton teas were sold in over 130 countries, with busy popularity in Europe, North America, the Middle eastbound, and part of Asia.Growth in the developed world was in the order of 1%-2% a year, but the markets of the developing worldspecifically India and Chinawere seen as particularly promising, with anticipated annual offset rates of close to 10%. op yo In 2010, Unilever sold nearly 350,000 h emorrhoid of tea. Approximately 90% came from external suppliers, with the remainder coming from Unilevers own estates in East Africa, including its flagship estate in Kericho, Kenya. Every market had a unambiguous taste in tea, making it to some extent dependent on supply from particular countries.For example, the North American market sourced frequently of its tea from Argentina, since its tea was particularly well suited for iced tea, which was popular in the U. S. The globose Tea Market tC Tea was the worlds most popular beverage after water. In 2009, most 4 million oodles of tea was produced in 46 countries, with China, India, Kenya, and Sri Lanka accounting for 70% of global production. 3 Kenya, where much of Liptons tea was produced, accounted for close to 8% of global production,4 but was the worlds largest exporter of tea (see Exhibit 14 for a breakdown of global tea production). No Russia, the U. S. , and the U. K. were the biggest net importers of tea, accounting for nearly 30 % of global imports. 6 Tea was consumed for a revolution of reasons and in a wide revolution of blends. For example, Japan with its strong orientation course for commonss tea consumed approximately a fifth of all global green tea supply. Tea was an ingrained part of daily invigoration in many countries for cultural and historical reasons. In other parts of the world, tea was becoming increasingly popular due to its perceived wellness benefits. 7Historically, global tea markets had suffered from over-supply. The resulting toll pressure was exacerbated by teas high degree of commoditization, low switching personifys for consumers, and teas perishability, which meant prices were often cut drastically to clear stocks. 8 As seen in Exhibit 6, despite moderate gains in the price of tea since 2000, the price of tea in real terms in 2010 was still 35% lower than its peak in the mid-1980s. 9 Tea Production and its Consequences Do Tea production was a very labor-intensiv e activity.With a few regional exceptions, tea production occurred year-round, as the top two to trinity sees of the plants were carefully advance- b This figure include some sales realize through the joint-venture with Pepsi on ready-to-drink products. These sales are not included Unilevers summation turnover. 3 This document is authorized for utilisation only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. write or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Sustainable Tea at Unilever rP os t 712-438 icked every 7 to 21 days, depending on the altitude and climate. 10 Tea plantsc could grow to a height of 30 feet or more, but were usually cropped at slightly 2 to 3 feet and then pruned regularly in order to make them easier to pick. 11 The leaves were pluck by hand and then processed immediately either on-the-spot(prenominal) at the plantation or at a bought-leaf milling machinery. 12 During processing, tea leaves were wi thered, macerat ed, oxidized, dried and sorted on site. The processed tea was then transported to a broker or auction, after which it was blended, sometimes flavored, and packaged.Finally, it entered the relevant retail sales channel before ending up with the consumer. op yo Inappropriately managed, tea production could raise a number of social and environmental concerns. The industry contained a mix of large-scale estates and smallholders, each with their own challenges. Over the years there had been reports of bad operative conditions on poorly managed plantations that damaged proletarian wellness through exposure to harmful pesticides and agrochemicals. In certain cases, the workforce included migrant laborers with no protection in case of illness, pregnancy or other factors. 3 They generally received low wages and were not always given medical care, ho development, education or pensions. Further, in some cases self-sufficient trade unions, when they existed, had been acc utilize of corruptio n or ineffectiveness. 14 tC For some smallholders who grew tea as a cash crop, tea production implied the conversion of tropical forests into agricultural land which could leave behind to reductions in local species diversity and to grunge degradation. 15 However, for most farmers unsustainable practices were a result of charge on increasing yields and not acreage.Logging for the firewood command to dry tea could lead to local deforestation, which could in turn led to problems in water retention. somewhat farms employd excessive amounts of fertilizers and pesticides, which could negatively affect soil quality and vitiate local soils and waterways. Years of commoditization had alterd to a downwards price spiral that be sick pressure on workers and the environment as farmers tried to safeguard their income. Unilevers Commitment to Sustainable Tea No Unilever starting signal established a set of good agriculture practice guide spots in 1998.The guidelines outlined sustainabl e farming practices for the suppliers of its major crops, including tea, palm oil and tomatoes, and included 10 key indicators of environmental, social, and economic performance, each with their own sub-parameters (see Exhibit 7b for more details). The guide was not imposed on external suppliers, but it was shared with them and with the broader public. This was the first move of this kind in the industry. Do In 2006, Michiel Leijnse began the process of transforming this internal commitmen t into a major consumer-facing initiative.He believed that many Western consumers had become sufficiently relate about sustainability that it might help drive product differentiation. More importantly, he saw this as an opportunity to transform the entire tea industry , benefiting not only tea workers and the environment, but as well as purchasers of tea who were reliant on a healthy supply chain. Aware that such a transformation was not costless, Leijnse explained the initiatives rationale If w e didnt do something to transform the industry, at some acid we just wouldnt be able to get the quality and quantity of tea we need.While we might see market share gains in c in that respect are two main varieties of the tea plant China and Assam. The Assam variety, which is mathematical functiond in India and Kenya, is the most common. All varieties can and are engrossd to produce green and scorch tea. There are many kinds of hybrids between the varieties, and other factors like soil, climate, altitude, pickax time, and processing all affect t he flavor. 4 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. write or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. 712-438 rP os tSustainable Tea at Unilever some markets, it wont always be the case. It is a challenge to properly icon the short -term and long-term interests of the brand. Tea hallmark and the rainforest Alliance op yo Leijnse and his aggroup d ecided to pursue certification for the brand, and chose the rainforest Alliance, a founding piece and secretariat of the Sustainable Agriculture salarywork (SAN), as its certification partner. There was significant overlap in both Unilevers and rain forest Alliances approach to sustainable agriculture practices, in that both concentrate on environmental, economic, and social factors.Further, the rain forest Alliance concentrate on market-based premiums preferably than fixed price supports (characteristic, for example, of FairTrade products) as the best way to nominate change. The rainforest Alliance had some consumer recognition from previously successful opposes certifying a range of other commodities, including bananas, coffee, and cocoa but had no prior experience with tea certification or on the African continent, where Unilever had decades of experience from its tea estates. Unilever set ambitious targets for the implementation of rain forest Alliance certification.By 2011, its initial target of having all Lipton Yellow track and PG tips tea bags in Western Europe conscious by 2010 had been successfully achieved. Lipton had committed to sourcing all the tea in Lipton tea bags from rainforest Alliance-certified estates by 2015, approximately a tertiary of all Unilever tea volume. And if Lipton were to meet the freights of the Sustainable Living Plan, by 2020, coulomb% of Unilevers tea would need to be sustainably sourced, although the Plan did not commit Unilever to using tea from Rainforest Alliance certified farms. tCThe certification process Rainforest Alliance certification evaluated farms according to 10 principles covering issues such as worker welfare, farm management, and environmental protection , each with its own criteria. 16 The Rainforest Alliance certified entire farms, so that in order for any of a farms crops to be certified, the entire production world for all crops had to meet the standards. In order to obtain and maintai n certification, a farm had to be in compliance with at least 50% of the applicable criteria associated with each principle and with at least 80% of the sum of silver set of applicable criteria.Further, there were fifteen critical criteria which were mandatory for certification, heedless of overall compliance (see Exhibit 7a for information on certification standards). 17 Do No While independent farmers bore the costs of complying with the Rainforest Alliance standards (for each estate or group being certified covered, there was a certification cost of approximately 3,000 to 4,500, or $4,000 to $10,000, depending on farm size18), Unilever also incurred costs in choosing to subvert certified tea. First, Unilever salaried a premium for the tea. In 2011, this was approximately 0. 08 per kilogram of tea.In 2010, the average market price per kilogram of tea was 1. 69 ($2. 28). 19 In the market for certified coffee, price premiums of 15% had been seen. From 2011, Unilever had to kic k in the Rainforest Alliance a participation fee in order to carry the organizations frog logo on its pack.. This fee was 0. 0089 ($0. 0125) per kilogram of tea. Unilevers Procurement organization devoted six full-time equivalent people to work on the roll-out of global certification education and spent approximately 200,000 per year on the development and deployment of farmer training in conjunction with the Rainforest Alliance.Scaling Certification in the Supply Chain Unilever had to certify to the highest degree a draw off of its tea volumes to meet its 2010 goals. Given the lack of any exist certified sources, Unilever and the Rainforest Alliance faced a significant challenge in developing large volumes of certified tea in a comparatively short time period. To terminus this, 5 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. write or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Sustainable Tea at Unile ver rP os t 712-438Unilevers efforts ab initio focused on certifying Unilevers own production in Kenya and Tanzania as well as some of its larger and better-managed tea suppliers. Achieving the firms 2015 and 2020 goals would require working further down the supply chain with littler, less organized suppliers operating in a wide variety of different countries, each of whom had different agricultural practices, government support, and institutional capacity. Unilever had been successful in building a certified supply chain in East Africa. Could this be replicated across the entire supply chain?The Certification of Unilevers Own Estates in East Africa op yo The Unilever estates in Kenya and Tanzania were the first sites to be certified. Unilever had actively worked to maximize long-term yields and to control costs ever since set commenced on the 13,000 hectare estate20 in Kericho, Kenya, in 1928. For example, tea bush prunings were left on the field to rot, sooner than being removed as waste or for use as firewood or cattle food, a practice that maximized soil fertility and water retention. The estate also carefully managed its fertilizer use.Fertilizer was not only expensive but also a potential curse to soil quality if mismanaged. On-site hydropower deliver the goodsd reliable electricity at tierce the cost of power bought from the Kenyan grid , and the tea was dried using wood sourced from fast- ontogeny eucalyptus forests planted on the edge of the estate. In contrast to estates in Asia, Kericho made only minimal use of agrochemicals and other pesticides, both because of the favorable climate and also through appropriate management of the surrounding land which was home to natural predators of many pests. tCThe Kericho estate also invested in the health and well-being of its 16,000 employees and their dependents. The employees, who were paying a fixed sum per kilo of tea plucked, typically earned twoand-a-half times more than the local agricultural mini mum wage. In addition, Unilever provided them with free access to company living accommodations and health care, including the companys hospital and pharmacies and the employees children were educated in company-owned schools. 21 The company had recently invested 1. 2 million to update many of these facilities. No The Kericho estate achieved some of the highest yields in the world , with annual yields of 3. to 4 tons per hectare, compared to an average of 2 to 3 tons per hectare in India. At the Unilever estate in Tanzania, which followed similar practices, the yields were 3 tons per hectare compared to less than 2 tons per hectare in the rest of the country. The sustainability work we did at Kericho made good agricultural sense, and in the long run it also made good monetary sense, explained Richard Fairburn, former managing director of Unilever Tea East Africa. We to a lower placestand that this is simply the way the industry needs to operate in order to survive and thrive. To further increase the supply of certified tea, Unilever identified a priority mention of its larger suppliers in Africa, Argentina and In dosia. legion(predicate) of these estates were already professionally managed and were certified adjacent adjustments to existing practices using available tools. 22 Working put through the Supply Chain Do Initial success with small-hold farmers in East Africa Certifying the 500,000 Kenyan smallholders from which Unilever purchased tea was a critical component of the Rainforest Alliance roll-out since East Africa alone accounted for nearly one third of Unilevers total tea requirement.Fortunately, Unilever was able to work with the Kenyan Tea Development style (KTDA) and with the IDH, the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative, to design a program that educate the trainers and led to the rapid diffusion of sustainable farming practices across the country. 6 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or p osting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. 712-438 rP os t Sustainable Tea at UnileverThe KTDA was a highly respected farmers joint covering 62% of all Kenyan prod uction through 59 factories. Its goal was to help local farmers receive better prices as well as to provide training and other extension services. In 2011, Unilever bought approximately 40% of KTDAs production. 23 Unilever worked with the Kenyan Tea Development authorisation (KTDA) and the Rainforest Alliance to educate the locally-elected lead farmers who did the bulk of the smallholder training. distributively factory elected 30 to 40 lead farmers, each of whom received approximately three days training.Most of the training costs were covered by external donors like IDH but it was expected that the KTDA would ultimately take over this responsibility, estimated to be about 1 to 2 ($1 to $3) per tea farmer. 24 op yo Each lead farmer was expected to train approximately 300 oth er farmers through group and individual training, with the focus of the training being active demonstration of sustainable agricultural practices. The meetings could also be used as a way to increase awareness of the potential price premiums paid for Rainforest Alliance certified tea.The certification criteria were broken down into actionable activities that could be easily rund and the Rainforest Alliance helped develop simple posters and admit lists that the lead farmers coul d distribute (see Exhibit 9 for an example). The process was intentional to be very participatory, and further technical support was provided by the KTDAs extension officers, who also received training. 25 Certification was organized at the factory level. For the external audit, the Rainforest Alliance or an authorized third party checked compliance with a sample of farmers at random.previous to this, each farmer was also internally audited by a lead farmer, but never by the same lead farmer who trained t hem. peak farmers received some modest financial support in the first year to cover the costs associated with their efforts. tC Most of the changes asked of farmers did not require huge changes in practice or much investment. For example, getting farmers to leave their pruning in the field (to improve soil quality) preferably than removing them for use as firewood infallible persuading farmers to plant trees for fuel. Tree seeds were very cheap and Unilever subsidise the cost.Farmers were also encouraged to make compost from organic waste rather than burning it, as well as making better use of waste and washing water. No Some changes were expensive. For example, the Rainforest Alliance standards required the use of personal protective equipment for the spraying of (approved) pesticides. This could cost up to $30, half a months salary for a smallholder 26. However, the KTDA set up its own micro-credit system of rules to assist farmers with these kinds of purchases, and in some p laces, the local smallholders had pooled money to steal a single set which was shared. 7 A navigate study done by Unilever in 2004 showed that total net investments were less than 1% of total cash farm income for the first year. Do Many of the farms saw yield gains of 5%-15% from the implementation of more sustainable practices, improvements in the quality of the tea, and reductions in operating costs as well as higher prices for their tea. Average income increased by an estimated 10%-15% and Unilever also entangle that sustainable practices would help farmers better adapt to the climatic changes, like deviant rainfall patterns, that many locals were already witnessing. 8 and according to Richard Fairburn, the most salient benefit to farmers was in their personal empowerment The Kenyan smallholders are ultimately interested in creating a farm in good health that can be passed on to future generations. That was the sustainability that resonated with them. By 2011 the Rainforest Alliance had successfully certified over one-third of the smallholder farmers in Kenya, and Unilever was footsure that eventually all Kenyan smallholders would gain certification.One encouraging sign was that some of the first groups to become certified had since 7 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Sustainable Tea at Unilever rP os t 712-438 independently re-create their certification. 29 Whether this model could be rolled out to other tea growing regions like misfire and India was, of course, still in question. Marketing the Sustainable Message to Consumers op yoWhile Unilevers procurement organization took the lead on sustainable sourcing, Leijnses major task was to explore whether and how the companys commitment could be translated into increased sales or market share. This effort was confused by the fact that Unilever had a portfoli o of tea brands, each with its own distinct brand proposition. Leijnse had responsibility for Lipton, the largest of the brands, but he needed to work closely with his fellow brand managers across the category to frame appropriate essences and to communicate them well.His research suggested that an increasing number of consumers were interested in a brands ethical position and that credible action could change consumer preferences, but no one believed that any of Unilevers tea brands should become green brands. Certification was never approached as green market, but rather as a new merchandise put across for consumers, explained one manager refer with the U. K. campaign. Consumers arent choosing our product because its green, but because this new message was align with their expectations for our brand. Retailers were very supportive of the certified tea some even demanded itsince the product was well adjust with the retailers own sustainability initiatives for their businesses and supply chains. Despite this, none of the brand managers wanted to charge a premium for sustainable tea. Instead they hoped to use certification to boost brand equity and, possibly, market share. The Early Successes of the Rainforest Alliance Initiative tC Rainforest Alliance certification was entraped with full-scale marketing campaigns for all of Unilevers biggest Western European and Australian tea brands, including Lipton Yellow Label, PG tips, and Lyons.In some markets the campaigns met with significant success. In others, however, the impact was much more limited. No The PG tips success The U. K. market was a large and important one for Unilever , representing just on a lower floor 10% of the firms tea production. The approximately 990 milliond (? 850 million) market was dominated by two major brands, PG tips and its rival Tetley Tea, who each had roughly a quarter of the market. 30 PG tips was a classic down(p) tea blend, with few line extensions. The U. K. was broad ly seen as a liberal country when it came to environmental policies .However, while Unilevers research suggested that the mass-market consumer was aware and come to about sustainability issues, broadly defined, they were not interested in paying more for green products. The PG tips brand was a mass-market, working class brand that held a place in the everyday lives of it consumers, who were in general middle-aged and middle-income. The brand proposition was one of sociability, family, and light-heartedness. This was captured in its ad campaigns which were infused with off-beat British humor. Do In 2008, PG tips was the only brand on the market proposing any sustainability differentiation.The marketing squad treated the initiative as a major brand innovation and devoted the entire 12 million (? 10 million) marketing egest in the launch year 2008 to promoting the efforts. Previous U. K. experience found that it took 12 to 18 months to address mental barriers and fully land a messag e with consumers. The challenge for the PG tips team was to find a message that would resonate with d Using exchange rate of 1 = ? 0. 86 as of celestial latitude 2, 2011 8 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011.Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. 712-438 rP os t Sustainable Tea at Unilever its core consumers while maintaining consistency with the brands core proposition. It was a huge challenge, explained Neil Gledhill of the PG tips campaign. We had to talk to mainstream consumers in a way that explained a complex topic without preaching, all in a languag e aligned with the brand. op yo The elect message, do your bit put the kettle on, emphasized the positive action that consumers could take by drinking PG tips.The campaign tried to keep the light-hearted spirit of the brands previous campaigns and used its well-established characters a talking monkey called Monkey and a working c lass man named Al. In one of the ads, for example, Monkey, presenting a slide show in the kitchen, explained to Al what certification meant, and how easy it was for him to do the right thing (see Exhibit 11). The campaign used TV and print, as well as a short characterization that was shown as a preview in cinemas and ultimately included as a DVD in special onward motion packs along with a tea towel.Packaging was also changed to include the certification shut and a exposition of the alliance. Prior to the campaign, PG tips and Tetley Tea were battling hard for the top spot in the British market. However, following the campaign, PG tips developed a significant lead in market share, with its market share increasing by 1. 8 points, while Tetley remained relatively flat and the purchase repeat rate increased from 44% to 49%. Sales of PG tips increased by 6%. Surveys suggested that there had been a dish increase in the perception of PG tips as an ethical brand following the launch of the campaign. No tC cast Sunshine the Australian success Like the U. K. , Australia was a relatively straight-forward tea market with only a handful of available products, and most sales in black tea. Prior to the launch of the campaign in 2009, the Lipton brand held nearly a quarter of the 260 millione (A$345 million) market. Unilevers other brand, Bushells, had an approximately 13 % share of the market. The local team chose the phrase provoke a Better Choice with Lipton, the worlds first Rainforest Alliance Certified tea, and because of the relatively small portfolio, it was implemented across the majority of the products.They felt that it was aligned with the existing brand vision, which had been Drink Better, Live Better, an attempt to increase the perceptions of quality and health benefits of the Lipton brand. The 1. 1 million (A$1. 4 million) campaign covered television, print, and public traffic. Unilever also support the initiative with in-store promotions. Packaging w as changed to include the Rainforest Alliance seal on the movement of the pack, with further explanation of the initiative and its benefits fit(p) on the hold up and sides.Customers were not charged a premium for certified tea since surveys had found that higher prices were a perceived barrier to sustainable consumption. carnal knowledge to the same test period the year before the campaign, sales were up 11 % and Liptons market share locomote by 158 butt points from 24. 2 % to 25. 8%. Average purchase rate per occasion rose from 3. 11 to 3. 23 (A$4. 10 to A$4. 25). The only area where the Lipton brand did not improve was on perceptions of quality, which decreased slightly during the campaign. Do abounding activation in Italy The Italian tea market was estimated to be approximately 285 million in 2010.Unilever had an approximately 12% share. 31 The Italian marketing team supported the certification with a 3 million complicated campaign of television, press, online, public re lations, in-store promotions, and packaging updates. The message chosen was your small transfuse can make a big difference. Following the first year of the campaign in 2008, Lipton saw s ales of its Yellow Label brand increase by 10. 5% and market share increase by over 2 full percentage points. It also witnessed an increase in its buyer base, which came generally from younger and more upmarket consumers. The Using exchange rate of 1 = A$1. 31 as of December 2, 2011 9 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Sustainable Tea at Unilever rP os t 712-438 team continued to support the campaign with in store promotion in 2009 and a web and editorial partnership with Italys National Geographic magazine in 2010, all of which cost 250,000. The French market disappointment In 2010, Lipton had a 37% market share in the 430 million French teaLiptons main c ontest came from retailers private label brands, which accounted for 30%-40% of sales. In France, Unilevers portfolio was more diversify Lipton sold over 40 different tea products. Whereas in the UK and Australia Unilever had been able to carry the certification message on the majority of its products, in France it was ab initio only linked to the Lipton Yellow Label black tea product, representing only about a fifth of sales. market. 32 op yo The first wave of the campaign in France relied heavily on a significant public relations effort to educate consumers and customers (i. . , the retailers) to inform them of Liptons certification efforts. The team focused on engaging key opinion leaders and journalists with press releases, media and press conferences, and trips to the Kericho estate in Kenya. The brands efforts were widely covered in the press and the team felt that they had made significant inroads attracting attention. Print ads with the message your tea can make a differenc e were placed in travel and cooking magazines and were primarily focused towards current consumers, who tended to be pistillate and over the age of 50.The teams research had suggested that French consumers were less likely to buy with a Rainforest Alliance seal on the box. This reluctance appeared to reflect a dislike of packaging change rather than any lack of concern for environmental issues, but as a result the team chose a staggered approach to package change, whereby certification was initially only announced on the inside of packs, before being added to the back of packs. Only in 2010 did the seal start to appear on the front of packs. This made it harder for consumers to link advertising support to the product they were seeing on shelves.No tC The campaign received TV support in 2009 and 2010 as well as an online competition , where the winners won a trip to Kenya, intended to engage consumers and bloggers. The limited television advertisements ran Q4 2009 and Q1 2010 and co ntained scenes of sustainable farms in Africa, as well as information about the Rainforest Alliance (see Exhibit 11). In total, only 10% of the teams marketing spend went towards livelihood the Rainforest Alliance message, with the remainder going towards more conventional promotion and support of other innovations.Lipton market share remained flat and awareness of the brand did not increase. Further, the campaign was not successful in linking Lipton to Rainforest Alliance, and Lipton was not seen as more ethical than other tea brands. Do The United States experience The U. S. tea market was an most 1. 5 billion ($2 billion) market in 2010. 33 Unilevers U. S. campaign was launched in the summer of 2009 with a particular focus on the brands green tea line, where Lipton was second in the market. The mainstream black tea range was not linked to the Rainforest Alliance initiative. order research had shown that 80% of U. S. consumers wanted to buy eco-ethical brands, although without sacrificing on cost or quality. Only 5% were willing to pay a premium. The message used was Your Small Cup Can Make a Big Difference, although Unilever also had other messaging for its ready-to-drink beverage line running concurrently. To generate credibility, Unilever allowed National Geographic to create independent TV, print, and online gist about the certification, which was published between June and September of 2009.The campaign was also supported by a sponsored trip to the Kericho estate for three online bloggers and journalists, as well as advertising in online and social media. The packaging was changed to include the Rainforest Alliance seal on the front of the pack and information about certification on the pack side and flap. A retail partnership with Walmart and Sams Club provided information and positive images at the point of purchase, which helped 10 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. du or 617. 783. 7860. 712-438 rP os t Sustainable Tea at Unilever reinforce perceptions of health and quality benefits (see Exhibit 13). Analyses done by the marketing team indicated a strong ROI for the 740,000 ($1 million) dollar mark campaign however given the size of the business, the investment was relatively small. Unilever did not see any significant effect on overall market share for Lipton or the Rainforest Alliance certified -green tea. Challenges Going advancing op yo A few years after the launch of the certification design many of Unilevers major competitors responded with their own certification programs.Tetley, Twinings, and Yorkshire Tea all made arrangements for some or all of their tea suppliers to obtain Rainforest Alliance certification, while Pickwick and Carmien Tea opted to use UTZ, a certification scheme originating in The Netherlands. Yorkshire Tea announced a goal of selling 100% Rainforest Alliance certified tea by 2 015 . 34 Twinings had goals of 100% certification by 2015 for its Everyday brand tea. 35 Tatas Tetley Tea vowed to have 100% of its branded tea certified by 2016, a year after Lipton. 6 The surge in demand placed pressure on the Rainforest Alliance, who expected to be certifying close to 20 %-25% of the worlds tea supply by 2015. 37 The emerge Market Challenge tC With competitors committing to third party certification, sustainable tea at Unilever faced a number of challenges going forward. On the supply side the company had to improve farming practices in some very difficult markets in order to meet the companys targets. On the marketing side, Leijnse and his colleagues had to decide how to proceed in emerging markets. Could consumers in countries like Turkey, Russia or India be persuaded to value certified tea?If so, how? And how could Lipton maintain a point of difference in countries where competitor brands had followed suit? Reaching 100% Sustainable Sourcing No In 2011, Unile ver sourced approximately 25% of its global tea requirement from India most of it was consumed domestically. Some Indian tea growers had already achieved Rainforest Alliance certification, but they were generally exporters and Unilever purchased a significant share of their production. Converting smaller domestic producers to sustainable practices presented (at least) two tricky challenges.First, developing an organizational model that could handle training and roll out seemed likely to be difficult. A large proportion of Indias tea was grown by smallholders who sold to local tea factories. However, in contrast to the situation in Kenya, there were no government sponsored tea-cooperatives, and farmers were free to sell to any factory. Some factories did provide extension services and training for their farms, but the quality of these services varied dramatically. Do Second, farming practices in India were in conflict with the Rainforest Alliance over two main issues, child labor a nd pesticide use.The standards did not earmark certified farms to employ anyone under the age of 15, but Indian fair play and the United Nations International Labor Organization permitted the vocation of 14 year olds in developing countries. Moreover in India the pesticide paraquat was widely used in tea production. It was quick and effective but it was also highly toxic when ingested or absorbed without protective equipment 38 and it was involve in many suicides in the developing world due to its low cost, potency, and widespread availability. Paraquat was banned by the European Union but allowed under restricted use in the U.S. 39 Rainforest Alliance standards did not permit its use, and as paraquat use was one of the critical criteria exceptions could not be made by country. 40 11 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Sustainable Tea at U nilever rP os t 712-438 Unilever could potentially address these issues by introducing an alternative standard tailored to Indias local practices. This standard could act as a stepping stone towards future certification.Unilever would almost surely need partners to transform Indian tea growing. One option was to work with local NGOs, as they had in Kenya, but another was to carry working with industry wide initiatives. Marketing in India and Other Emerging Markets op yo getting the messaging right in India would be another important challenge. Tea was the traditional hot beverage of India and the market was estimated to be 1 billionf (RS 64. 6 billion) in size, with Unilever the market leader with a share around 30%. Demand for tea was robust, with the market growing an estimated 12% per annum by value and 3% per annum by volume from 2005 to 2010.The demand for tea had actually outstripped the growth in national tea production, resulting in tea price increases in 2010. 41 Approxi mately two-thirds of the market, by volume, was sold as unbranded discharge black tea (in bulk). Only one-third of the market was branded tea, which was almost exclusively loose black tea in packets. Tea bags equal less than 2% of the market, but were a growing segment. G reen tea was another high-growth category, particularly in urban areas, because of its perceived health benefits. 2 Almost three-quarters of all tea was still sold through independent small grocers, but supermarkets and hypermarkets had begun to slowly increase their share as locomote incomes began to shift consumer buying behavior. Branded coffee shop chains had also become popular, particularly with young Indian consumers, who increasingly viewed tea as an old-fashioned beverage. 43 tC Unilevers Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Unilever, sold mostly through two major brands, Brooke Bond and Lipton, who had market shares of 19 and 6% respectively in the branded tea market.Its main competitor was Tata world-wide Be verages who had a market share of 26%, mostly under its Tata Tea brand, which had almost 20% of the market by retail value. 44 But Unilever also faced competition from regional tea companies who took pride in tailoring their blends and preparation methods according to local preferences and who often competed aggressively on price. No Under the Sustainable Living Plan umbrella, Hindustan Unilever had begun to introduce products knowing to improve the quality of life of Indias poorest consumers, including new, highly effective hand slashs and a range of water purifiers.The company had also been marketing pasture Excel, a concentrated laundry detergent, which required up to two few buckets of water for washing than competing products. 45 The company believed that if the environmental issue was substantial and had an immediate local impact, awareness and appreciation of the issue was generally high. But it was less clear if Unilever could communicate the comparatively distant benef its of sustainable tea farming. Do Michiel Leijnse wondered whether the companys recent experience in Turkey could provide any lessons.In Turkey, the tea growing industry played a promine nt role in national cultural identity, and the Turkish team had chosen a message that suggested certified tea offered national benefits, highlighting gains to domestic producers, as well as to the countrys tea crops (see Exhibit 8). Should something similar be attempted in India? He also had to consider how tea could be marketed in emerging markets where there was no tea growing base. One such example was Russia, where Unilever had a 16% share of the almost 3 f Using exchange rate of 1 = RS 69. 6 as of December 2, 2011 12This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. 712-438 rP os t Sustainable Tea at Unilever billiong ( gall 115 billion) market in 2010. Tea was a tradi tional Russian drink consumed by almost everyone. 46 The market was led by a domestic tea manufacturer, and while volume growth had been limited, sales in the market had been growing at close to 15% since 2005, as consumers switched to more expensive varieties of tea and as the major Russian brands continued to expand the range of their offerings. 7 Could Unilevers sustainable tea platform serve as the basis for product differentiation that would drive growth and market share in Russia? Or should Unilever forego any promotion of sustainability and instead focus on other ways of competing in the Russian market? Concluding Thoughts op yo With the launch of Rainforest Alliance certification in 200 7, Unilever had started the transformation of the tea industry and improved the lives of hundreds of thousands of farmers. It had also demonstrated that in certain markets certification could increase market share.However, with most major tea manufacturers implementing aggressive certificatio n targets of their o wn, it appeared that sustainability might, at least in Western markets, become increasingly more a cost of doing business and less a source of competitive advantage. Unilever needed to decide not only how to fit that 100% of its supply chain could be sustainably sourced, but also how that message could be communicated in a diverse group of emerging markets. Michiel Leijnse also needed to decide how far he could push sustainability in the brand.If Unilever were to reach its targets under the Sustainable Living Plan, all agricultural raw materials would eventually need to be sustainably sourced, including the paper and board used for the tea packaging and tea bags (see Exhibit 10). Could this be communicated to consumers in a useful way? Do No tC Looking across Unilever, Leijnse wondered if his experiences in tea had anything to contribute to marketing managers grappling with the potential benefits of 100% sustainable sourcing.From a marketing perspective, tea an d the Lipton brand had been an obvious choice to st art talking about sustainability given the tight link between the raw material and the end product. The same could not be said for many of the other raw materials that Unilever purchased. For example , Unilever was the worlds largest buyer of sustainable palm oil and it had committed to ensuring that all its purchases came from sustainable sources by 2015. Consumers did not ultimately buy sustainable palm oil, but rather products such as soap and edible fats that used it as one among many ingredients.Unilever was uncertain whether to create awareness of its efforts among consumers. Moreover, Leijnse had experienced increased attention and criticism from activists since launching the Rainforest Alliance partnership would the Sustainable Living Plan potentially make Unilever a bigger target for scrutiny? Were there any lessons that could be learned from Lipton? g Using exchange rate of 1 = RUB 41. 4 as of December 2, 2011 13 This doc ument is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Exhibit 1Sustainable Tea at Unilever rP os t 712-438 Unilever Income Statements, 2006-2010 ( Millions) 2010 44,256 37,637 6,619 15. 0% -992. 86 6,338 14. 3% 206. 97 -413. 94 6,131 1,534 4,597 2008 40,519 21,340 19,179 47. 3% 12,012. 79 1,002. 90 7,166 17. 7% 361. 96 -399. 96 7,128 1,844 5,284 2007 40,116 20,522 19,594 48. 8% 13,790. 41 941. 28 5,235 13. 1% 646. 66 -5,175 1,126 4,049 2006 39,647 20,095 19,551 49. 3% 13,900. 57 982. 07 5,408 13. 6% 181. 87 -4,832 1,146 3,686 3,370 -3,370 3,370 8. 5% 5,284 0 5,284 5,026 12. 4% 3,801 80 3,881 3,881 9. 7% 3,415 1,330 4,745 4,745 12. 0% 1. 46 1. 46 1. 46 0. 86 1. 17 1. 17 1. 17 0. 69 1. 3 1. 73 1. 73 0. 69 5. 12 5. 24 5. 24 0. 72 4. 6 6. 4 6. 4 0. 45 op yo 2009 39,821 33,933 5,888 14. 8% -1,031. 94 5,020 12. 6% 324. 98 -428. 98 4,916 1,257 3,659 4,243 -4,243 4,243 9. 6% tax revenue Cost of Goods Sold porcine Profit Gross Profit Margin SG&A Expense Depreciation & Amortization run Income Operating Margin Non-operating Income Non-operating Expenses Income Before Taxes Income Taxes Net Income After Taxes Continuing operations Discontinued Operations agree Operations Total Net Income Net Profit Margin tC thin out EPS from Continuing Operations Diluted EPS from Total Operations Diluted EPS from Total Net IncomeDividends Per Share reference work Unilever income statements, via Hoovers Inc. , www. hoovers. com, accessed November 2011. Exhibit 2 Revenue and Operating Income by Divisiona, 2010 ( Millions) Ice Cream & Beverages Personal Care Home Care Total 14,164 11,318 2,846 20. 1% 8,605 7,881 724 8. 4% 13,767 11,471 2,296 16. 7% 7,726 7,253 473 6. 1% 44,262 37,923 6,339 14. 3% No Savory, Dressing, & Spreads Revenue Operating Expenses Operating Income Operating Margin come social club documents. a Some of Unilevers other brands include Hellmans, Knor r, Becel, Heartbrand Icecream, Breyers, Axe, Dove, Vaseline, Omo,Do and Surf. 14 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. LOreal Reckitt P Danone Nestle Colgate Unilever Revenue Growth by play along (%) CAGR, 1980-2009 9. 4% 8. 5% 6. 9% 6. 0% 5. 2% 3. 8% 3. 5% bloodline Company documents. Exhibit 4 Nestle Reckitt LOreal Danone Colgate P&G Unilever CAGR, 1980-2009 18. 6% 16. 9% 16. 6% 14. 0% 12. 6% 12. 4% 10. 2% 2000s 3. 6% 10. 6% 7. 8% 0. 5% 3. 1% 6. 1% -2. 0% tC 1980-1989 37. 5% 24. 2% 23. 4% 31. 1% 16. 0% 17. 1% 1. 5% 1990-1999 21. 7% 7. 6% 34. 7% 10. 3% 23. 0% 17. 7% 10. 6% 2000-2009 3. 4% 16. 1% -3. 1% 2. 4% 0. 9% 6. 6% -3. 4% EBIT Margins by Company (%) 1980 11. 0% 10. 5% 9. 3% 8. 4% 7. 9% 6. 8% 5. 7% No LOreal P Reckitt Nestle Colgate Danone Unilever 1990s 9. 8% 5. 9% 4. 8% 5. 7% 5. 4% 5. 4% 2. 5% Enterprise Value Growth by Company (%) lin e of descent Company documents. Exhibit 5 1980s 13. 7% 8. 9% 8. 3% 11. 5% 7. 8% -0. 2% 8. 1% op yo Exhibit 3 712-438 rP os t Sustainable Tea at Unilever 2009 14. 2% 20. 5% 25. 2% 14. 6% 24. 0% 16. 4% 14. 8% Margin growth (bps) 326 999 1591 621 1610 963 912 Do cite Company documents. 15 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Global Average Tea Pricesa, 1960-2010 (US cents per kilogram) op yo Exhibit 6 Sustainable Tea at Unilever rP os t 712-438 World databank, tC Source Adapted from World Bank data, Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities, http//databank. worldbank. org/ddp/home. do? Step=1=4, accessed November 2011. Do No a Base year is 2000. Prices are averages of Colombo, Kokata, and Mombasa auctions. 16This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprote cted harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Exhibit 7a Ten Core Principles of Sustainable Agriculture engagement kindly and Environmental management System Ecosystem conservation Wildlife Protection Water Conservation Fair Treatment and Good Working Conditions for Workers Occupational Health and safeguard Community Relations Integrated Crop Management Soil Management and Conservation Integrated Waste Management op yo 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 712-438 rP os t Sustainable Tea at UnileverSource Sustainable Agriculture Network, Our Standards SAN Principles, Sustainable Agriculture Network website, http//sanstandards. org/sitio/subsections/display/7, accessed December 2011. Exhibit 7b Company documents. Do No Source Agrochemicals and fuels Soils Water Biodiversity Energy Waste Social and human capital zoology welfare Value chain & local economy Training tC 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Ten Indicators of Unilever Sustainable Agric ulture Code 17 This document is authorized for use on ly by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 83. 7860. Exhibit 8 Sustainable Tea at Unilever Rainforest Alliance Messaging in Turkey rP os t 712-438 tC op yo As Lipton, Turkeys expert tea brand and responsible tea producer, we want to ensure that our tea will be passed on to our children and future generations. To this end, we are victorious the first steps in our Sustainable Tea Farming Project by combining our expertise with the passion of the tea growers in dreary Sea Region. Our goal is to enhance existing agricultural practices and to generalize the use of those that conserve the ecological balance by raising awareness among more than 15,000 tea growers in the egion about the tea planting and harvesting. We are committed to accomplish this goal in a way that will enable to gain Rainforest Alliance Certified status for our farmers. Remember that you support our farmers with every cup of Lipton tea you drink. Do No Source Company documents. 18 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Educational Poster for Smallholders in East Africa Do No tC op yo Exhibit 9 712-438 rP os t Sustainable Tea at Unilever Source Company documents (via Rainforest Alliance). 9 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Sustainable Tea at Unilever Unilever Agricultural Raw Materials by Volume, 2010 Do No tC Source Company documents. op yo Exhibit 10 rP os t 712-438 20 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Exhibit 11 712-438 Examples of Rainforest Alliance advertizement tC op yo PG tips (U. K. ) rP os tSustainable Tea at Unilever Do No Lipton (France) Source Company documents. 21 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. -22- tC No Source Company documents. Exhibit 12 Do Unilever Sustainable Living Plan Targets op yo rP os t 712-438 This document is authorized for use only by LINDA KELLY-HAYES until June 2011. Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. emailprotected harvard. edu or 617. 783. 7860. Examples of U. S. In-Store Promotions Exhibit 14 Global Tea Production, 2009 (Tons)